Tag Archives: IBM

Dave Winer rewrites the history of the PC

From Dave Winer’s iPad review:

“IBM didn’t try to turn the world upside-down with the PC in 1981, however, in 1984, they did, with the PC jr, and failed.”

This is actually almost the inverse of the truth. Don Estridge, who headed up the IBM PC project, turned the way that IBM worked on its head in order to get the thing built. While he may not have intended to change the entire world, he certainly changed the internal world of IBM. He had to, in order to get the job done.

And the PC jr certainly wasn’t an attempt to change the world – in fact, it was a poor product largely because of the need to preserve the status quo for IBM. As Michael Schrage puts it in Serious Play:

“A primary reason for the failure of the IBM PCjr home computer in the mid-1980s was that IBM management had decided it might cannibalize sales from IBM’s popular line of personal computers. The product of a spec-driven culture, the PCjr was deliberately hobbled in the prototyping process to thwart that possibility.”

I’m not sure that Dave’s kick-off analogy is that good, either:

“If you’re old enough to remember the vice-presidential debate between Lloyd Bentsen and Dan Quayle, you’re also old enough to remember the PC jr.

Quayle, a fit young man, probably chosen as a running mate because of his fitness, was likely told by his handlers to compare himself to the fit young John F. Kennedy. When he did, Bentsen, who was many years his senior, and was probably briefed to expect this, said: “Senator, I served with Jack Kennedy. I knew Jack Kennedy. Jack Kennedy was a friend of mine. Senator, you’re no Jack Kennedy.”

Entrepreneuers make the same mistake Quayle made, they always compare themselves to the winners, never considering that losers outnumber winners by a huge margin.”

The winner of the 1988 vice-presidential election? Dan Quayle.

Reblog this post [with Zemanta]

Daring Fireball’s wishful thinking

I totally understand where John Gruber is coming from with his post on “The OS Opportunity“. The problem is that there’s a whole lot of wishful thinking in there.

First of all, go read John’s post. Rather than try and summarise here and potentially mischaracterise what he’s saying, you just go read it.

Back? Good. Then we’ll begin. John’s first point is that what kept people on DOS was simply file compatibility:

“In those days, before DOS ran most competing platforms out of the market, interoperability and data interchange were at best difficult, and often impossible. Data was stored in incompatible file formats written to incompatible floppy disks1 by incompatible apps compiled for incompatible CPU architectures. Even later in the ’80s, when networking became common (at least in businesses) the network protocols were proprietary.

That was the world where DOS won out. Get everyone on DOS and you could all open each other’s WordPerfect and 1-2-3 files, if only by sharing them on floppy disks. So DOS gained users, and because it gained users it got developers, and because it gained developers it got more users.”

While this is partially true, it ignores two other factors which always mitigate against switching platform – and which continue to do so today.

The first is familiarity. Familiarity, to geeks like me and John, is something you often avoid like the plague. Geeks like us like tinkering with new stuff, learning how to do new things with new tools. We switch because it’s fun (today’s example of this from John: Switching to Camino. Only geeks like us look at switching browsers as the kind of thing you can do on a whim. Why else does the blatantly inferior IE retain so much market share?)

But for someone with years of experience of DOS (or Windows), running WordPerfect and Lotus, switching to an alternate operating system and set of applications was always a big deal. The path of least resistance was always to stick with the platform you’re on, because learning new stuff got in the way. GUIs mitigated this a bit – but didn’t change the situation with applications. For someone who’s been using Excel professionally for 10 years, switching to Numbers is a big, big deal – and that’s despite Numbers being pretty easy to get your head around.

This is even more apparent in the business world, where switching means training hundreds of users in how to use the new tools. There’s a very good reason why corporates tend to be a couple of versions behind the latest, even for products where there’s a clear, delineated upgrade path and a level of familiarity.

The second reason is the oldest one in the book: money. If you’re a seasoned Windows user, switching from Windows to Mac doesn’t just cost you the time to learn new applications (even when there’s a Mac version of a Windows app, they’re usually different enough to cause angst). You have to actually buy the applications, because few (if any) companies give freebies to switchers.

Of course, this second issue isn’t an issue if you’re switching from closed source to open source. And some of it is also negated by being able to use freebie tools on the web. But the more complex your needs, the less likely it is that either can fill them. And the quality of both free online tools and open source stuff is (to be kind) variable, particularly when it comes to the kind of simplicity of interface design that someone switching OS’s is going to appreciate. I know – I’ve done it.

“A similar feedback loop is going on with the iPhone today, but it’s far less sticky. The DOS/Windows monopoly grew impregnable because it was a platform where the only way to play along was to join it.”

John’s right that this feedback loop is going on with the iPhone, and that it’s less sticky, but there’s two reasons for that. First, the smartphone software market is nascent: it’s in the equivalent of the era of (as John puts it) “the Apple II, the IBM PC and DOS, Commodore, Atari, Acorn. The TI-99/4A.”. People forget that DOS wasn’t the only game in town – only the weight of IBM’s brand and the anti-trust rules which allowed Compaq and a slew of others to clone the IBM PC really made it the overall winner. Even the iPhone, which is massive in terms of mindshare, only has 17% of the smartphone market. That’s about as much as the Apple II had at its high-point. The smartphone market is still massively fragmented – and it’s a very open question whether that will continue.

John’s bet, I think, is that it will continue to be fragmented – although I don’t think he overtly states this, so please forgive me if I’m reading something in that’s not really there.

I think that assuming this is true says a lot about what you believe is the future of mobile software. If you think that smartphone software is fundamentally one-trick apps, throwaways, stuff which is easy to develop and easy to dump, then jumping from one smartphone to another is always going to be easy.

But if you think that developers are going to create more and more complex apps, and that these are what consumers will increasing demand and use, then switching becomes more of an issue. The fact that Omnifocus is only on iPhone will almost certainly mean that my next phone will also be an iPhone, despite my constant pain at the fact that the iPhone doesn’t multi-task. If there was no Omnifocus, I would switch. And I suspect that I’m going to be increasingly not alone – with 100,000 apps, the potential for the “just one app that I need” being on iPhone grows.

“If Palm can create WebOS for pocket-sized computers — replete with an email client, calendaring app, web browser, and SDK — why couldn’t these companies make something equivalent for full-size computers? The hard part of what Palm is doing with WebOS is getting acceptable performance out of a cell phone processor.”

Because no one would buy it. It’s not like people haven’t tried. There’s a very good reason why people have chosen Windows netbooks over Linux ones, even when Linux has been cheaper – they want to run the apps they are familiar with. And they don’t generally just want web apps – they want native ones. Rich beats thin, every time.

“These PC makers are lacking in neither financial resources nor opportunity. What they’re lacking is ambition, gumption, and passion for great software and new frontiers. They’re busy dying.”

And this is where John’s wishful thinking really comes to the fore. Who, exactly, is dying? HP, which made $2.2 billion profit in its last quarter? Dell, which made $472 million profit? While those aren’t as good as Apple’s numbers (because SteveJ has played a very smart game), neither looks like a company that’s “busy dying” to me.

Reblog this post [with Zemanta]